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HELP ME DOC! THEORIES OF ADMISSIBILITY OF
OTHER ACT EVIDENCE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation of the admissibility of trial evidence, the issue from which
every other admissibility question evolves, concerns whether the piece of
information offered by the proponent is relevant to any material element of
the case.' According to language provided by the federal government, the
judge or magistrate presiding over a particular contest needs to ascertain
whether proffered evidence has "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.",2 Unfortunately for the
judicial officer in question, his or her analysis does not end here. Though the
judge can admit only relevant evidence, the judge is not required to admit all
relevant evidence. 3 The officer has discretion to exclude any evidence if he or
she concludes that its probative value is "substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
4
A proponent's use of other act evidence can be of great concern to judicial
officers because such evidence can easily implicate the problems noted in
1. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF
SCIENCE AND STATUTES 175-82 (5th ed. 2001).
2. FED. R. EVID. 401. To satisfy the rule, a proponent of evidence must satisfy the presiding
judge or magistrate that the proffered evidence is related to some material fact in the case. CARLSON,
supra note 1, at 180-81. The evidence need not be groundbreaking, but must simply have some sort
of a positive or negative effect on a desired inference that happens to be material to the case. Id. at
175-76.
3. See FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 404. By its very language, Rule 403 gives trial judges
the discretion to keep logically relevant evidence out of their courtrooms. The rule begins with the
following language: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if' the trial judge, in his or her
discretion, deems it necessary to do so. FED. R. EVID. 403.
Similarly, if not expressly then by implication, the language of Rule 404(a) forbids the use of
some relevant evidence. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The rule states that "[e]vidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion ... " Id. A proponent could assuredly find evidence that was
relevant to a person's character, but, by the language contained within Rule 404(a), the proponent is
forbidden from using it to prove that person's actions on a particular occasion. See id.
4. FED. R. EVID. 403.
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.5  By definition, an "other act" is an act
performed by a party, or somehow connected to a party or witness, other than
the act with which the case at hand is immediately concerned.6 Because other
acts concern events or actions not immediately before the court, judicial
officers may find that their use is less probative than other types of evidence
and may unduly prejudice the opponent, confuse the jury, or remove focus
from the real issues in the case.7 Moreover, there is a fear, reflected in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, that if other act evidence is freely admitted at trial,
solely on the basis of having general relevance to an issue in the case, the jury
may be tempted to decide the case based upon a desire to punish a party for
the other acts, rather than to decide the case based upon the issue with which
the case should be concerned.8 As a result of this fear, a proponent's use of
other act evidence is restricted to a certain degree. 9
Before the. Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1975, courts
generally followed one of two opposing policies concerning when to admit
5. Specifically, Rule 403 discusses "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or .. .considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Id.
6. CARLSON, supra note 1, at 335-36. Professor Daniel Blinka describes an "other act" in the
following manner:
The incident need not have resulted in a conviction or civil judgment, nor must it have been
a "bad act." The other act may have occurred prior or subsequent to the incident which is
being litigated. Moreover, the other act may be that of a party, a witness, or a third person.
The prime criterion for admission is relevance.
Daniel D. Blinka, Evidence of Character, Habit, and "Similar Acts" in Wisconsin Civil Litigation, 73
MARQ. L. REV. 283, 303 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
The Federal Rules of Evidence use the concept of other acts in Rule 404(b):
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
8. See 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:03, at 9
(1998). The reflection mentioned in the text can be seen with respect to Rule 404(a) and (b). Both
subsections to the rule state that a proponent cannot use evidence of a person's character or other acts
performed by that person to make an argument that the person is predisposed to commit the act in
question. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)-(b). By ruling out this use of the evidence, the language also
effectively invalidates the use of past evidence to convince the fact-finder to punish for past acts.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
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and when to forbid the use of other act evidence.' °  One policy was
exclusionary in nature." Under this policy, courts refused to admit other act
evidence in general, allowing admission only for a few narrow and well-
recognized exceptions. 12  The other policy was inclusionary in nature.'
3
Under this policy, a court generally allowed other act evidence to be admitted
into trial for any purpose other than to show that the party opposing the
evidence acted in conformity with a character trait in the commission of the
act that was the subject of the action.' 4 Congress codified the inclusionary
rule as Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.15
According to Rule 404(b), other act evidence can be offered to
demonstrate "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."' 16 The use of other
act evidence in connection with the listed items of relevance has been
addressed to varying levels of detail and continuity by a large number of
courts." Though the list within Rule 404(b) contains various manners in
which to use other act evidence, many commentators have concluded that the
list offered in the rule is merely one of examples and not of the only allowable
uses. 18 The courts have followed suit, finding that the list is not exhaustive,
but only representative of the relevant purposes for which a proponent can
10. Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1557
(1998); see CARLSON, supra note 1, at 337-38.
11. Melilli, supra note 10, at 1557.
12. Id. Under one formulation of the exclusionary rule, other act evidence "was admissible
only if it was logically relevant on such well-recognized theories as motive, identity, and intent."
CARLSON, supra note 1, at 337 (citing Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence:
America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938)).
13. Melilli, supra note 10, at 1557.
14. See id; CARLSON, supra note 1, at 338. In the context of a criminal trial, "if the facts
support a theory of logical relevance other than the 'verboten' one, the prosecutor may use the...
evidence to show" any number of things relevant to the action. CARLSON, supra note 1, at 338.
15. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 781 (1981); see Blinka, supra note 6, at 308. In the context of
discussing the State of Wisconsin's version of Rule 404(b), professor Blinka states that "[i]n short,
the main concern is that the other incident be relevant to something other than a general disposition
or propensity to engage in harmful conduct." Blinka, supra note 6, at 308. See supra note 6 for the
text of Rule 404(b).
16. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
17. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct
to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 577 (1990). "Rule 404(b) has generated more published opinions than any other
subsection of the Federal Rules." Id.; see Blinka, supra note 6, at 302. Issues of the admissibility of
other act evidence are "the most frequently litigated question[s] arising under the rules." Id
18. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 659 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); Melilli, supra
note 10, at 1557.
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offer other act evidence.' 9
Jurisdictions have failed to treat other act evidence consistently in
criminal and civil contexts. Since the Federal Rules of Evidence were
promulgated, courts have relied on Rule 404(b) to a great extent in criminal
cases.2 0  On the other hand, courts have not relied on Rule 404(b) to a great
extent in civil cases. 21 By its language, Rule 404(b) would seem to apply
equally to both criminal and civil cases.22 Specifically, the rule is entitled
"Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts," not simply "Other Crimes."2 3 Until now,
however, many courts have not read the statute to apply equally to both types
of actions.24 A majority of jurisdictions remain content to hold other act
evidence to a higher standard of admissibility in the context of civil trials than
in the context of criminal trials, despite the obvious argument that the
forbidden propensity of character inference can create greater harm in
19. E.g., United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Miller, 895
F.2d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
20. See 2 Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 577; Blinka, supra note 6, at 302.
21. See Blinka, supra note 6, at 302 (noting that the "vast majority" of appellate cases dealing
with other act evidence are in the criminal, and not the civil context); 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8,
§ 7:01, at 4 ("To date, Rule 404(b) has rarely been invoked by civil plaintiffs.").
22. The rule is subtitled "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts," not simply "Other Crimes." FED. R.
EviD. 404(b). Additionally, there is nothing in the language of the rule that limits its application to
criminal cases. See Blinka, supra note 6, at 307; 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 7:01, at 4 ("Rule
404(b) seems to govern the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence in civil as well as
criminal actions.").
Professor Blinka found that the Wisconsin version of Rule 404(b), section 904.04(2) of the
Wisconsin Statutes, "also applies to civil actions." Blinka, supra note 6, at 302. He goes on to note
that "'the common law rule [of the use of other act evidence] was equally applicable in civil cases.
Rule 404(b) has a similar scope, since nothing in the rule limits it to criminal cases."' Blinka, supra
note 6, at 307 n.76 (quoting C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5239, at 443 (1978)).
23. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (emphasis added). It is true that the last portion of Rule 404(b)
speaks to the "prosecution in a criminal case." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The specific language is as
follows: "the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any
[other act] evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Id. It is possible to infer from such language that
the rule applies to criminal cases and, because civil cases are not mentioned, not to civil cases.
However, an alternate understanding of the language is that the proponent of other act evidence must
comply with extra restrictions in the context of criminal cases, and that these restrictions are not
applicable to civil cases. Additionally, Rule 404(b) is surrounded by many other Federal Rules of
Evidence, none of which specify that they apply only in the criminal context. See FED. R. EVID. 401-
415. See generally supra note 22.
24. See CARLSON, supra note 1, at 353-54. "The standards for admitting evidence of other acts
in civil actions are stricter than those applied to the admissibility of evidence of other crimes in
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 353. The authors also note that courts will often require that the other
accidents offered as other acts in tort cases be similar to the accident at issue in the trial in order to be
admitted into evidence. Id. at 352.
[87:981
OTHER ACT EVIDENCE
criminal prosecutions.25
At present, other act evidence is not used to its full advantage in the
context of tort actions.26  While other act evidence has been used in some
areas of tort law, especially in the area of products liability,27 the use does not
appear to have extended to medical malpractice actions, where, currently, the
use of this type of evidence is infrequent at best.28 The possible explanations
for this apparent lack of use are numerous. For example, in some instances,
the absence of the evidence may be due to unreceptive jurisdictions, unwilling
to expand the breadth of admissible evidence. In other instances, the absence
may be explained by the differences between medical malpractice law and
criminal law.29 Finally, the lack of use of the evidence may simply be due to
a lack of creativity on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys. Regardless of the
reasons, there are unexplored and underdeveloped means by which to use
other act evidence in the context of medical malpractice cases.
Part II of this Comment will survey how other act evidence has been used
in medical malpractice cases decided by various jurisdictions in recent years.
Through this exploration, this Comment will discuss how different
jurisdictions have approached the problem of other act evidence admissibility.
25. Id. at 353-54. If other act evidence is used in the context of a criminal case, the misuse of
the evidence for purposes of proving the defendant's character could result in conviction and
incarceration. 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 7:01, at 4 ("A criminal conviction has a more
devastating effect on the defendant's reputation than an adverse civil judgment, and the criminal
defendant may have his life or liberty at stake."). If other act evidence is used in the context of a
civil case, the misuse of the evidence would result in, at worst, a lost money judgment for the losing
party.
26. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 7:13, at 53 ("[T]he evolution of the law governing
the admissibility of [other act evidence] in civil cases has lagged behind the development of the law
in criminal cases."). On the other hand, other act evidence has not been underused in litigation in
general. See Blinka, supra note 6, at 302.
27. See 2 IMWTNKELRIED, supra note 8, § 7:01, at 5 n.2. See generally Gail A. Randall,
Comment, Product Liability Litigation: Impact of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) Upon
Admissibility Standards of Prior Accident Evidence, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 799 (1983).
28. As of February 6, 2004, a search on LexisNexis.com returned only ninety-nine results
under the following search: no date restrictions; the all federal and state cases database; the terms
"(other act evidence or 404(b)) and (medical malpractice or doctor negligence or physician
negligence)." See also supra note 21; Blinka, supra note 6, at 3 10 (noting that there are few appellate
cases dealing with other acts in a general civil case context).
29. For example, Rule 404(b) specifies that a proponent can use other act evidence to shed light
on the intent of the other party to commit the act that is the subject of the action. FED. R. EVID.
404(b) ("Evidence of [other acts] ... may... be admissible for other purposes such as proof of...
intent .. "). A typical medical malpractice action is going to include a claim for negligence. The
plaintiff will not likely have an opportunity to argue that the defendant intentionally failed to act in
the manner that a reasonable doctor would have. As a result, it is unlikely that intent is a valid object
of the use of other act evidence in medical malpractice cases. See infra notes 111-14 and
accompanying text.
2004]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
Part II will also show the importance of the terms selected by the proponent of
the other act evidence and the importance of the overall relevance of the
evidence.
Part III of this Comment will explore manners in which other act evidence
can be used in medical malpractice cases in the future. Specifically, this
section will investigate how some of the proper uses of other act evidence
listed in Rule 404(b) 30 can be used in medical malpractice cases by
analogizing past uses of the items in criminal cases to possible uses in the
context of physician negligence cases.
Finally, Part IV of this Comment will explore whether any theories of
other act relevance exist in the medical malpractice context outside of those
theories mentioned in Rule 404(b).
II. EXISTING OTHER ACT EVIDENCE JURISPRUDENCE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
This section is intended to act as a general survey of arguments already
made by attorneys in support of the admissibility of other act evidence in
medical malpractice cases and the rulings made by the courts in response.
One matter to note at the outset is that different jurisdictions do not treat this
issue consistently. Some jurisdictions are very strict when it comes to
admitting evidence that concerns other accidents, as opposed to other
crimes.31 The state of Georgia, for example, seems to follow the exclusionary
rule, and it excludes most evidence of other accidents without regard to the
purpose for which the evidence is offered.32 On the other hand, other
jurisdictions have admitted evidence of other accidents under a relatively wide
range of circumstances.33 Federal circuit courts, for example, have stated that
they will allow evidence of other accidents under the situations described in
Rule 404(b).34
This section will not attempt to synthesize a general rule from all
30. Other act evidence can "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED.
R. EviD. 404(b).
31. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text, and infra note 32 and accompanying text.
32. See Kutner v. Davenport, 360 S.E.2d 586 (Ga. 1987) (noting that other act evidence is only
allowable to prove intent or motive in select circumstances); Gunthorpe v. Daniels, 257 S.E.2d 199
(Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that evidence of other acts is normally not admissible in actions for
negligence).
33. See, e.g., Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2002); King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265
(8th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's ruling that other act evidence could be properly
excluded because it was unduly prejudicial, but stating that such evidence could be offered to prove
purposes listed under 404(b)).
34. See, e.g., supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions, 35 but instead will provide a few examples of cases in which
other act evidence was at issue in a medical malpractice context. Part A
provides a discussion of a North Dakota case in which a proponent of other
act evidence was unsuccessful in convincing the courts to admit it. Part B
provides a discussion of a Texas case in which a proponent was successful in
getting other act evidence admitted. Part C discusses a case in which an
Arizona court eventually admitted evidence that could be considered other act
evidence, but did so by using unorthodox reasoning. Finally, Part D provides
a discussion of a court that was probably overly lenient in allowing the use of
certain other act evidence.
A. North Dakota: Kunnanz v. Edge
In Kunnanz v. Edge,36 the plaintiff had surgery to remove a kidney stone
that had lodged in his upper ureter.37 The defendant doctor performed a
procedure called an ureteroscopy in order to remove the stone, whereby an
instrument was inserted into the ureter of the patient.38 The surgery proved
unsuccessful and, as a result, the plaintiff was forced to go to a different
doctor in order to have the stone removed.39 The second surgery also proved
unsuccessful. 40 After the second procedure, the plaintiff went to a third doctor
who subsequently determined that the plaintiff had suffered serious and
irreparable damage to his ureter and to one of his kidneys. 4' As a result of the
damage suffered by the plaintiff, the damaged ureter and the connected kidney
were removed.42
At trial,43 the plaintiff wished to use previous acts of the defendant
doctor 44 as evidence against him. 45  The plaintiff alleged this evidence
demonstrated that prior to the operation performed on the plaintiff, the
defendant doctor had performed an identical operation on another patient,
35. In fact, it is doubtful that such a formulation is even possible.
36. 515 N.W.2d 167 (N.D. 1994).
37. Id. at 169.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Prior to the suit in question, the plaintiff brought suit against the second physician to
perform the surgery, claiming that the defendant was negligent in performing the ureteroscopy and
claiming that he suffered a perforated ureter and a lost kidney as a result. Id. The plaintiff was
unsuccessful in that suit. Id. The suit with which this Comment is concerned is a suit against the
first doctor. Id.
44. The first doctor in the factual scenario.
45. Id. at 171.
2004]
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resulting in similar damage to that patient's ureter, and the eventual removal
of the connected kidney.46 According to the appellate court, the plaintiff
argued that the testimony was offered for the purpose of showing that the
defendant lacked the necessary "skill and competence" to adequately perform
the ureteroscopy.47
In determining whether to admit the evidence, the court relied on the
familiar rule that "[n]egligence generally cannot be prove[n] by showing the
commission of similar prior acts by the same person., 48 Apparently, the court
understood the other act evidence in question to be offered for the sole
purpose of proving negligence in the present instance based upon the
existence of a similar accident involving the defendant in the past.49 As a
result of its understanding of the intended use of the evidence, the court ruled
that the evidence was not admissible at trial. 50
The plaintiff did not offer the evidence for an acceptable purpose under
North Dakota's version of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).51 He made the
mistake of attempting to prove that the defendant physician had a character
trait for negligently performing the surgery in question. In general,
commentators have found such a character inference to be no less dangerous
than the related inference in the context of criminal cases that a person
committed a crime because he or she has a bad character.
53
Using the benefit of hindsight, it seems possible that had the plaintiff
illustrated the evidence (or had the court understood the evidence) as being
relevant to something other than proving a character propensity for
negligence, the court would have allowed it. For instance, the plaintiff may
have succeeded in convincing the trial court to admit the evidence if he had
explained that the purpose of the evidence was to prove that the prior surgical
accident put the defendant on notice that a dangerous condition of some sort
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing N.D. R. Ev. 404(b)); Lange v. Cusey, 379 N.W.2d 775, 777 (N.D. 1985).
49. Kunnanz, 515 N.W.2d at 171.
50. Id. The court did find that the evidence could have been admissible to impeach the
defendant's credibility during his testimony. Id. at 171-72. Ultimately, however, the appellate court
found that the trial court was justified in excluding the evidence for even that purpose on the basis
that it would have been unduly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 172.
51. Id. at 171.
52. Id.
53. See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 8, § 1:03, at 10 ("This danger [of the jury drawing an
impermissible inference] also arises in civil actions."); Blinka, supra note 6, at 295 ("Although
seductively easy to draw, the inference [of conduct in conformity with a character trait] is often a
weak one."); Heidi L. Vogt, Comment, Wisconsin 's Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Rule: An
Analysis of Section 904.04(2), 73 MARQ. L. REv. 319, 324 (1989) ("These inferences, in effect,
destroy the presumption of innocence.").
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existed in relation to the operation. Specifically, the plaintiff could have
introduced evidence that an instrument used in the first operation was flawed,
or that the technique used in the first operation was problematic. The plaintiff
in the case discussed immediately below makes use of such an argument.
B. Texas: Farr v. Wright
In Farr v. Wright,54 the plaintiff underwent medical diagnostic procedures
to ascertain the extent of an injury that she had sustained at work.55 In order
to discover the scope of the injury, the defendant doctor performed a three-
level discogram on the plaintiff, a procedure in which a needle is inserted into
three different spaces between the subject's vertebrae.56  Soon after
undergoing the procedure, the plaintiff began to suffer from severe pain, and
the defendant was unsuccessful in discovering the cause of that pain.
57
After some time, and the worsening of the plaintiffs physical condition, a
second physician examined the plaintiff and found that each of the three areas
around the spinal column in which the defendant doctor had inserted the
needle had become infected.f To cure the plaintiff of these infections, the
new physician prescribed intravenous antibiotics for a period of two months.59
In addition to the infections, the plaintiff was found to have suffered severe
damage to her spine as a result of the discogram procedure, resulting in
significant disabilities.6 °
The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against the defendant
doctor, claiming that he had been negligent in his technique of ensuring the
sterility of the needles used in the discogram procedure.61 In support of this
allegation, the plaintiff desired to use evidence of past incidents involving the
defendant physician, whereby previous patients had become infected in a
manner similar to the plaintiff.62 Specifically, the plaintiff desired to show
that the incidence of a patient contracting the infection after having the
defendant perform the surgery was considerably higher than the normal
incidence of such infection stemming from surgery performed by any other
physician. 63 The facts reported in the decision demonstrate that during the
54. 833 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1992).
55. Id. at 598.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 599.
62. Id. at 598-99.
63. Id. at 599.
2004)
MARQUEITE LA WREVIEW
two-month period immediately prior to the procedure performed on the
plaintiff, three or four other patients of the defendant had contracted the same
64infection after undergoing treatment.
According to the appellate court, the plaintiff argued that the evidence of
the prior incidents of infection was relevant to prove that the defendant
physician had knowledge that his sterility technique was ineffective and, thus,
dangerous to patients.65 In order to strengthen her argument, the plaintiff also
emphasized that the circumstances of her injury were very similar to the
circumstances surrounding the previous incidents of infection that involved
past patients of the defendant doctor.66 Finally, and importantly, the plaintiff
did not use the evidence of the prior infections to prove simply that the
defendant doctor had a character trait of performing surgery in a negligent
fashion. Ultimately, the court agreed with the plaintiff's arguments and ruled
that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving the defendant's
knowledge of a dangerous condition.67
C. Arizona: Gasiorowski v. Hose
The following case, Gasiorowski v. Hose,68 provides an example of other
act evidence being admitted in a medical malpractice action, but not through
the use of Rule 404(b) or an equivalent.69 Preceding the filing of the case, the
defendant doctor administered an epidural anesthetic to the plaintiff, an
expecting mother.70 Soon after the completion of the procedure the plaintiff
began suffering from a wide variety of physical problems, including swelling
of, and numbness in her legs. 7' After some time, the plaintiff began to suffer
from dystonia, a "cramping, spasmodic condition that.., left her wheelchair
bound.
7 2
The plaintiff brought suit against the physician, claiming that he had been
negligent in the manner in which he had administered the epidural anesthetic
into her spinal canal.73 At trial, the plaintiff desired to use evidence that
fourteen months after the defendant doctor performed the procedure on her,
64. Id. at 598.
65. Id. at 599.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 602-03.
68. 897 P.2d 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 679.
71. Id. at 680. In addition, the plaintiff allegedly felt some discomfort during the actual
procedure. Id.
72. Id. at 679.
73. Id.
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the defendant's employer suspended his license to administer epidurals, citing
the defendant's alleged "difficulty threading the epidural catheter., 74  The
suspension report contained information of three prior incidents wherein the
defendant had performed the epidural procedure incorrectly. 75 Though the
decision does not convey precisely how the plaintiff offered the evidence at
trial, the trial court denied its use under the Arizona version of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), explaining that the plaintiff was attempting to use the
evidence in order to prove that the defendant had acted in conformity with a
character trait for negligence.76
The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed with the analysis of the trial
court; 77 however, the response of the appellate court was not to simply rule
that the evidence was admissible under the Arizona version of 404(b).
Instead, the appellate court's admissibility analysis was a little unorthodox.
Instead of treating the suspension of the defendant doctor's license as
other act evidence and deciding whether or not it should be admitted under a
404(b) analysis, the appellate court found that 404(b) should not have been
invoked at all.78 The appellate court reasoned that the evidence of the license
suspension was not other act evidence, but was, instead, evidence of the
defendant's habit in the performance of administering epidurals. 79 As a result,
the court found that Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 and of the
Arizona Rules of Evidence, should have been used by the trial court instead of
Rule 404(b).8'
The Arizona appellate court somehow found that the license suspension, a
punishment that was based upon three incidents of misconduct,8 was
evidence of habit as opposed to evidence of an other act. In support of this
74. Id. at 680-81.
75. Id. at 681.
76. Id. Additionally, if the plaintiff did in fact intend to offer the evidence under the guise of
404(b), the case does not note what alternative theory of relevance she claimed the information
related to.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. FED. R. EVID. 406.
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that
the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with
the habit or routine practice.
Id.
81. Gasiorowski, 897 P.2d at 681.
82. Id.
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finding, the court began with the following recognized definition of habit: "A
habit... is [a] person's regular practice of responding to a particular kind of
situation with a specific type of conduct. 83 To illustrate its understanding of
the definition, the court made use of an example provided by McCormick of a
person's habit to "'bound[] down a certain stairway two or three steps at a
time,'''84 apparently likening that scenario to the defendant doctor's three
incidences of misconduct. Beyond this limited explanation of the definition
of "habit," and a short comparison of that definition to the legal term of
"character,, 85 the court failed to explain in further detail how the three
incidents of misconduct were evidence of a habit, as opposed to other acts.
The court neglected to consider that in addition to the above statements of
the legal definition of a habit, many commentators and judges alike feel that
the action in question needs to be somewhat unconscious in nature in order to
be considered a habit.86 According to one school of thought, for a certain act
to be considered a habit it must be almost "Pavlovian" in nature, an
unthinking response to a common stimulus. 87 In light of these refinements to
the legal definition of "habit," most jurisdictions likely would not find that the
actions of the defendant doctor in Gasiorowski were evidence of a habit. The
threading of an epidural catheter is a dangerous procedure that requires a great
deal of skill, very unlike the much quoted example of a habit, where a person
switches on a turn signal prior to changing lanes while driving an
automobile.88 Additionally, it seems doubtful that a doctor performing the
83. Id. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195, at 825 (4th ed. 1992)).
84. Id. at 681 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195, at 826 (4th ed. 1992)).
85. Id. at 681-82. According to the text cited by the court, "'Character is a generalized
description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as
honesty, temperance or peacefulness....' Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195, at 825
(4th ed. 1992)).
86. See Blinka, supra note 6, at 312. The author explains the two recognized understandings of
the legal concept of habit:
First, the narrow psychological denotation describes a classic conditioned response: a semi-
automatic reaction repeated almost unvaryingly in the face of certain specific
circumstances. Second, a broader, probabilistic conception addresses the frequency and
specificity of the occurrence of an act. That is, the more often a person or an organization
has behaved in a certain way in a particular context in the past, the more likely it is that the
individual or organization will behave the same way when confronted with the same
circumstances on another occasion.
Id.; see also CARLSON, supra note 1, at 333-34 (citing Washington State Physicians Ins. v. Fisons
Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993)).
87. CARLSON, supra note 1, at 333 (citing Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOwA L. REV. 413, 417 (1989)); see also Blinka, supra note 6, at
312.
88. Blinka, supra note 6, at 311 (citing C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 195, at 574-75 (3d ed.
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surgery would do so in an unthinking manner. It is likely that each new
patient that a physician treats presents some variation from the norm that the
physician must take into account before and during surgery. As such, it is
probable that each patient would desire the utmost care by the doctor in
performing the procedure, and not some common, mechanical, one size fits all
approach to a very delicate surgery.
Ultimately, the importance of the Gasiorowski decision is not that the
Arizona appellate court was wrong in its determination of the admissibility of
the evidence, 89 but that multiple theories of admissibility are at the disposal of
plaintiffs attorneys. It is unlikely that many other courts would be willing to
follow the lead of the Arizona court in this decision; however, this case
demonstrates that when attempting to have other acts by the defendant
admitted into evidence at trial, attorneys should argue for admissibility under
theories of both other act evidence and habit evidence. Additionally, the
admissibility rules of habit are not concerned with avoiding possible
inferences into a subject's character.9° As such, attorneys wishing to use
outside evidence might have an easier time getting the evidence admitted
under the guise of habit.
91
D. Ohio: Siuda v. Howard
In Siuda v. Howard,92 the claims of seven different plaintiffs were
consolidated into one medical malpractice action against the defendant doctor,
an ophthalmologist.93  The plaintiffs, all former patients of the defendant,
claimed that the defendant was guilty of negligence in recommending and
performing surgery for glaucoma, cataracts, or both.94 At trial, the plaintiffs
wished to use expert testimony to point out that the defendant doctor had
previously been cited for operating needlessly, that one patient, outside the
group of plaintiffs, was blinded after a procedure performed by the defendant,
and that other former patients of the defendant had suffered other serious sight
1984)).
89. Admittedly, it is quite possible that many people would agree that the court was correct in
finding the evidence in question to be admissible as habit, rather than other act, evidence.
90. The language of Rule 406 allows the proponent of evidence to prove that conduct on a
particular occasion was in conformity with the person's habit. See FED. R. EvID. 406. The language
of 404(b), on the other hand, expressly forbids a proponent of evidence from using other act
materials to prove that a person acted in conformity with his or her character. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
91. In fact, there is some evidence that this has already happened. See Blinka, supra note 6, at
307 ("[T]here is a marked inclination to resort to 'habit' or 'routine practice' as a convenient way of
justifying the admissibility of [other act] evidence.").
92. No. C-000656, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2314 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002).
93. Id. at *3.
94. Id.
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complications that stopped short of blindness. 95 The defendant claimed that
the evidence was unduly prejudicial against him and should have been
excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).96 The Ohio appellate court
ruled that the evidence was admissible under rule 404(b), concluding that it
was relevant to prove the defendant's "motive to perform medically
unnecessary surgeries; his knowledge as an ophthalmologist; and an absence
of mistake or accident."
97
Despite the assertion that other act evidence is often incorrectly deemed
inadmissible, the Ohio appellate court may have been overly generous in
admitting the other act evidence in Siuda. In support of its decision to admit
the testimony, the appellate court provided only a blanket statement that the
expert's opinion may have been relevant to one or more of three things.9 8
In the first instance, the court stated that the expert's testimony might have
been relevant to the defendant doctor's motive to perform unnecessary
surgeries. 99 From the information given in the opinion, the expert testified
only that the defendant doctor did perform unnecessary surgeries;'0 0 the expert
did not explain the reason why the defendant performed the unnecessary
surgeries. It is not clear how this simple statement had any bearing on the
defendant's motive for operating unnecessarily. °10  Even if the expert's
statement had any tendency to prove motive, many courts would surely find
that the statement's minimal relevance would be substantially outweighed by
the prejudicial effect it could have against the defendant in terms of character.
As such, many courts would not admit the evidence under the powers granted
by Rule 403.'02
In the second instance, the court stated that the expert's testimony might
have been relevant to prove the defendant's knowledge as an
ophthalmologist.10 3 The challenged testimony of the medical expert was as
follows: "'[The defendant is] operating needlessly .... I have seen four of
95. Id. at *20-21.
96. Id. at *21-22.
97. Id. at *22.
98. Id. at *23.
99. Id.
100. See id. at *20-21. The court quotes the expert as testifying that "'[the defendant is]
operating needlessly."' Id.
101. In other words, it does not make sense to say that the doctor was motivated to perform
unnecessary surgeries because he performed unnecessary surgeries.
102. See FED. R. EVID. 403. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." Id.
103. Siuda, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2314, at *22.
[87:981
OTHER ACT EVIDENCE
[the defendant's] patients with serious ... complications. One resulted in
blindness.' '10 4 The court neglected to make clear how this testimony was
relevant to the knowledge of the defendant doctor. The simple allegation that
the doctor operated needlessly or that some of his patients suffered
complications from surgery does not suggest that the defendant had
knowledge of a dangerous condition and ignored that condition to the
detriment of reasonable care.
In the third instance, the court stated that the expert's testimony could be
used to prove the defendant's absence of mistake or accident. 10 5 The court,
however, does not explain how this item of relevance, listed among the
sanctioned uses in Rule 404(b),0 6 is useful in the context of a negligence
action. Clearly, proof of the absence of a mistake or accident can be relevant
in the context of a criminal case by helping to show that whatever occurred
must have been the result of an intentional act.' 0 7 However, this logic does
not function in a negligence action, where the intent of the actor to cause harm
is not at issue.
Ultimately, Siuda and Gasiorowski can be considered as two examples of
courts being overly generous in admitting other act evidence. Though it is
unlikely that such generosity extends throughout a large number of
jurisdictions, these cases serve as a reminder to attorneys to consider as many
theories of relevance as possible to get their evidence admitted at trial.
Il. POSSIBLE RULE 404(B) OTHER ACT USES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS
The previous section of this Comment explored some of the few instances
wherein appellate courts have addressed the subject of admissibility of other
act evidence in a medical malpractice context. This section will explore how
some of the alternative areas of relevance listed in Rule 404(b) for use with
other act evidence 0 8 can be used in medical malpractice cases.'
0 9
At the outset, it should be noted that due to the inherent nature of medical
malpractice actions, and the inherent nature of negligence actions in general,
104. Id. at *20-21.
105. Id. at *23.
106. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
107. For example, a party can circumstantially prove intent by showing that the event in
question could not have been the result of an accidental occurrence.
108. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). The rule states that proponents of evidence can use other act
evidence to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." Id.
109. The purpose of which is to give ideas to attorneys how to proceed when faced with other
act issues in this area of law.
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many of the alternative areas of relevance listed in Rule 404(b) are not likely
to be of much use to. a proponent of other act evidence in a medical
malpractice action. For example, Rule 404(b) specifies that other act
evidence can be used to prove the intent of the defendant." ° Medical
malpractice actions are not concerned with whether a physician intentionally
harmed a patient,'11 but with whether a physician fell below the standard of
care a reasonable doctor would provide in a given situation.1 2 Additionally,
other items listed by Rule 404(b), including plan and, as explained in the
previous section, 13 absence of mistake or accident will likely be of little use
to a party in a medical malpractice action.1 4 On the other hand, some of the
other items listed in the rule could be useful to a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice case. The remainder of this section will explore two of these
possibilities.
This section is intended to explore how the alternative uses of other act
evidence listed in Rule 404(b)11 5 have been employed in cases not involving
medical malpractice and how the same uses may successfully be incorporated
into medical malpractice cases. Two representative cases have been selected
for discussion, not for the context in which the evidence is used, 1 6 but for the
alternative theory of relevance from Rule 404(b) used in each particular case.
Part A provides a discussion of the use of knowledge, and Part B provides a
discussion of the use of identity."
7
110. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Ill. Such an act would likely be adjudicated under an intentional tort theory, like battery.
112. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 258-59, 333 (1996).
113. See supra Part II.D.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
115. See id.
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, or the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
Id.
116. In fact, all of the selected cases happen to be criminal cases.
117. Other items of relevance listed in Rule 404(b) also could be used. See supra note 115;
James v. McKenna, No. 02-318 Section "K"(1), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *4-7 (E.D. La. Jan.
27, 2003) (ruling that evidence of a defendant doctor's financial condition, offered in an attempt to
prove the doctor's motive for operating needlessly, was inadmissible under Rule 403 as unduly
prejudicial).
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A. Knowledge: United States v. Tringali
The case of United States v. Tringali1 8 provides a good example of the
use of other act evidence to prove a defendant's knowledge. The two
defendants were both charged with, and imprisoned as a result of, 9
"conspiring to possess with intent to distribute ten kilograms of cocaine and
possession with intent to distribute two kilograms of cocaine."' 120  In the
process of prosecuting one of the defendants at trial, the government was able
to convince the court to take judicial notice of an earlier conviction of that
defendant for "conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute four kilograms
of cocaine."12
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that the other act
evidence was relevant to the defendant's knowledge. 2 2 At trial, one of the
defendant's original defenses against the charges was that he could not have
conspired to possess and distribute the cocaine because he lacked the
necessary knowledge to organize a deal of such size.' 23  The government
argued, and the courts agreed, that the previous conviction for intent to
distribute four kilograms of cocaine indicated that the defendant did, in fact,
possess the knowledge necessary to organize and complete the charged
offense. 124  The court elaborated, explaining that the two events were
sufficiently similar in circumstances to assume that knowledge of how to put
together the deal, the subject of the 1984 conviction, would translate into
knowledge of how to put together the deal that was the subject of the
appeal. 125 Finally, the appellate court found that the limiting instruction given
by the trial court to the jury, informing the members not to use the 1984
conviction as evidence of the defendant's character, was sufficient to protect
118. 71 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1995). Numerous other cases also address the use of other act
evidence to prove a defendant's knowledge in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Duong, No.
03-6028, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25868, at *6-7 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2003) (In a prosecution for
money laundering, the government successfully used evidence of the defendant's previous tax returns
to prove that the defendant had knowledge that the money he used for various activities was illegally
obtained.); United States v. Halak, No. 02-1014, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 21965, at *4-5 (2d Cir. Oct.
23, 2003) (In a prosecution for an attempt to export stolen cars, the government successfully used
evidence of the defendant's association with other stolen cars to prove that he knew that the vehicles
in question were stolen at the time he attempted to export them.).
119. Defendant Tringali pled guilty to reduced charges; defendant Hernandez was convicted of
the charges after a jury trial. Id. at 1377.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1379.
122. Id.
123. Id. The size of the drug deal that was the subject of the conspiracy charge was ten
kilograms. Id. at 1377.
124. Id. at 1379.
125. Id.
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against that very possibility.12 6
As Tringali demonstrates, it is possible to use other act evidence to prove
the defendant's knowledge in criminal cases. The knowledge of a defendant
can also be relevant in the medical malpractice context. Two hypothetical
scenarios can help to demonstrate when a defendant doctor's knowledge can
be relevant, although the concept of knowledge is probably broad enough to
encompass an endless number of additional scenarios.
The first scenario concerns the presence of a possible dangerous condition
within the operating room. 127 Consider a physician who has witnessed two of
her former patients, both of whom she has operated on in the past few months,
develop the same infection. Despite knowing about these infections, the
doctor continues to perform the same procedure on other patients, changing
nothing of the manner in which she sterilizes the instruments necessary to
perform the operations. A third former patient of hers develops an infection
identical to the one suffered by the two earlier patients. If this third patient
were to bring a medical malpractice suit against the doctor, he or she may be
able to point to the two previous instances of infection as events that would
have put a reasonably prudent doctor on notice that something was amiss with
his or her sterilization procedures. In other words, the defendant doctor may
have had knowledge that a dangerous condition was present in the operating
room, yet failed to act upon that knowledge under circumstances where such
failure was malpractice.
The second scenario may present more problems of undue prejudice than
the first 128 but, nonetheless, should be explored. Consider a doctor who has
just learned a new, but widely accepted, procedure and has begun to perform
it on patients. Within the first few months of practicing this procedure, two of
the patients on whom he or she has operated suffered complications stemming
from some misstep by the doctor during surgery. If another patient later
suffers the same complication while under the doctor's care, 29 he or she may
wish to use evidence of the earlier accidents in a malpractice claim against the
defendant doctor. The proponent of such evidence may be able to convince a
126. Id.
127. This idea was already discussed to some extent in Part 1I.B, in relation to Farr v. Wright,
833 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1992). See supra Part II.B.
128. In other words, the argument may come too close to saying that the defendant committed
the current negligent act in question because he or she has a character trait for carelessness. As a
result, a court may find the proffered evidence unduly prejudicial towards the defendant and disallow
its use in accordance with Rule 403. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
129. As Tringali demonstrates, a court may be more likely to accept other act evidence if the
other act in question contained many circumstances similar to the act with which the court is directly
concerned. 71 F.3d at 1379.
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court that the previous instances are relevant to the doctor's knowledge of his
or her own skill in performing the procedure. In other words, the proponent
would be arguing that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant
doctor would have known, in effect, that he or she did not know how to
correctly perform the procedure in question, based upon the two previous
incidents involving other patients. Such an argument could be especially
useful under circumstances wherein the particular procedure was highly
technical in nature, and the operation was difficult to reconstruct after the fact.
B. Identity: United States v. Mack
The case of United States v. Mack3 ° provides a good example of using
other act evidence to prove a defendant's identity. In Mack, the defendant
was ultimately convicted of three counts of armed robbery, in addition to a
few other offenses. 13' To aid in the prosecution of the case, the government
attempted to use evidence of another armed robbery committed by the
defendant that had occurred after the commission of the crime that was the
subject of the case, but before the trial began. 32 The government argued that
the subsequent robbery committed by the defendant was relevant to proving
the defendant's identity and, thus, was admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b). 133
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the decision of the district court to
allow the evidence of the subsequent bank robbery, agreeing that the evidence
was relevant to the identity of the defendant. 34  In the second armed
robbery, 35 the defendant was seen wearing a "ski mask in conjunction with a
hooded sweatshirt," and committed the crime by jumping over the bank teller
line prior to the act of receiving the money, and jumping back over the teller
line after having received the money. 36 In the armed robbery that was the
subject of the action, the perpetrator, though not seen with his mask off, had
130. 258 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001). Numerous other cases also address the use of other act
evidence to prove a defendant's identity in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, No. 01-
2158, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15644, at *9-13 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2003) (In a bank robbery prosecution,
the government successfully used evidence of a stolen car in the defendant's possession to help prove
the defendant's identity as that of the robber.); United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir.
1995) (Identity can be used if the proponent can "demonstrate that the two acts exhibit a
commonality of distinguishing features sufficient to earmark them as the handiwork of the same
individual.").
131. Mack, 258 F.3dat 551.
132. Id. at 553.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 553-56.
135. The "other act" for purposes of the trial.
136. Mack, 258 F.3d at 553-54.
2004]
0 MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
been seen wearing the same clothing and performing the offense in exactly the
same manner as the defendant in the subsequent robbery. 37 Because of the
similarities between the two offenses, the court found that the identity of the
perpetrator in the second instance was relevant to proving the identity of the
perpetrator in the first instance. 
138
As Mack demonstrates, there is ample opportunity to use other act
evidence for the purpose of proving the defendant's identity in the context of
criminal trials. Under different factual scenarios, it may be possible to use
identity in the context of medical malpractice actions as well.
Consider a hypothetical scenario involving two doctors who were present
during an operation upon a patient. During the course of this operation, one
of the two doctors committed malpractice, injuring the patient. Assume that
the plaintiff won a malpractice judgment against the two doctors as
codefendants. The non-negligent doctor now seeks indemnification from the
negligent doctor for the part of the damage award he or she paid to the former
patient. Assume further that the two doctors are the only witnesses to the
operation, and that each one is denying culpability. Under circumstances
wherein each doctor had a manner of performing the surgery distinctively
from the other, the results of previous surgeries performed by the two could
be relevant to prove identity. Specifically, a previous instance of negligence
involving one of the doctors, wherein his or her particular distinctive
technique was used, could be relevant to prove the identity of the doctor who
committed the negligence in the later instance.
IV. POSSIBLE NON-404(B) OTHER ACT EVIDENCE RELEVANCE
As found by courts and commentators alike, the list of valid uses of other
act evidence contained within Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is not
exhaustive. 139  The list is intended only as a representative grouping of
allowable uses of other acts. 140 Additionally, the federal government codified
137. Id. In other words, the perpetrator in both situations was seen jumping over the teller line
both before and after the robbery was completed. Id.
138. Id.
139. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 659; see, e.g., United States v. Ford,
No. 01-2158, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15644, at *9 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2003) ("Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 'is
actually a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion .... ') (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v.
Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir.
2001) ("Rule 404(b) is viewed as 'an inclusive rule .... ') (quoting United States v. Van Metre, 150
F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)
("The list of permissible uses is not exclusive."); United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (allowing the government to use other act evidence of the defendant's predisposition to
commit a specific crime in order to counter the defendant's assertion of an entrapment defense).
140. Mack, 258 F.3d at 553-54.
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the inclusionary rule of the uses of other act evidence in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' 4' As such, a proponent may need to satisfy the court only that she
is not using the other act evidence in order to show that the defendant doctor
has a propensity to commit negligent acts. 142 As a final part of this analysis,
one additional mode of relevance, not expressly described within the confines
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), will be explored.
Earlier in this Comment, it was explained that the traditional use of other
act evidence to prove the absence of accident or mistake would not likely
apply to medical malpractice actions. 43  In its normal use, proof of the
absence of an accident or mistake can be a sort of backhanded manner of
proving that the act in question was intentional. ' 44  Such absence, used to
prove intent, cannot be of much use in negligence actions, where intent is not
even an element of the cause of action. 45 However, it may be possible to use
a similar concept in a malpractice context. Under certain circumstances,
proof of the absence of a non-negligent accident or mistake could be used as
proof of negligence.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. In the span of six months,
three different patients of the same doctor, out of a total patient pool of ten,
suffer the same complication from the same surgery. In other words, thirty
percent of the doctor's patients suffered the complication. Assume that the
normal rate of occurrence of that complication is well known in the medical
community to be, at most, one percent when caused by a non-negligent
source. In a situation such as this, because the rate of occurrence suffered by
the patients of our doctor is substantially higher than the expected rate of non-
negligent occurrence, one could infer that there is a strong likelihood that
negligence played a role in the complications. In other words, the high
frequency with which the complication occurs can be relevant to show that the
complications were caused by the doctor's negligence.
Assume that the third patient who suffered the complication brings a
malpractice suit against the doctor and wishes to use the surgeries of the other
two injured patients as other act evidence. A court may allow evidence of the
141. See supra note 15.
142. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part III, II.D.
144. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (reversing a decision of the court of appeals
excluding evidence of prior incidents of a father beating his child used to show the possibility that the
child's death was not an accident); CARLSON, supra note 1, at 344. In the latter source, the authors
discuss the doctrine of objective chances, wherein "if the defendant suffered a particular type of
loss.., more frequently than the average, innocent citizen would sustain such losses, the defendant's
claim of accident is objectively implausible." Id. at 344.
145. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
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previous incidents, and their rate of occurrence, to prove the absence of a non-
negligent cause of injury, thus indicating that the injury was caused by a
negligent act.
Of course, it is very possible that a court faced with the argument made
immediately above would consider it to run too parallel to the forbidden
propensity argument concerning negligent character and, as a result, forbid its
use. 146 Additionally, the same court, if it does not forbid the use of the
evidence because of its similarity to the propensity argument, may forbid its
use by ruling that the admission of the other failed surgeries into evidence
would unduly prejudice the defendant doctor in accordance with the balancing
test contained within Rule 403.147 Notwithstanding both of these possibilities,
it is also possible that a court faced with this issue for the first time would
accept the use of the evidence in the manner laid out above. The only true
means to verify what a court will do is to present the argument under relevant
circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of other act evidence in the context of medical malpractice cases
is really an unknown quantity. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, courts and attorneys alike have been quick to make use of the
evidence within criminal trials, but for whatever reason have not made great
use of the evidence in the realm of medical malpractice cases. There is little
reason for this difference. This Comment, by discussing some of the few
instances in which the evidence has been litigated, and by discussing some of
the possibilities for the future use of the evidence, is meant to encourage
attorneys to use other act evidence in medical malpractice cases when doing
so is relevant and beneficial to the case at hand.
The use of other act evidence in non-criminal and non-products liability
cases seems to be a prime example of an area of law in which the
jurisprudence lags well behind the logical end of the applicable legal
proposition. Rule 404(b) arguably was intended to codify the inclusionary
rule of other act evidence for all areas of law; however, practice has not kept
up with theory in the area of medical malpractice law. Part II of this
Comment highlighted some of the instances, if very few in number, where
proponents of the use of other act evidence have been successful in
convincing courts of the propriety of its use. Parts III and IV demonstrated
that there are other uses of the evidence that remain to be explored.
146. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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Other act evidence can benefit both plaintiffs and defendants in medical
malpractice suits. In the interests of diligently representing their clients, and
of pushing the state of case law to meet the state of statutory law, proponents
should make every attempt to use relevant other act evidence in medical
malpractice cases in the future.
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